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Abstract:  
Since it emergence on the international scene more than two decades ago, Hamas has stuck to 
its guns, labouring tirelessly to establish a Muslim state based upon the principles of Jihad, 
and to propagate Jihadi values in all aspects of life as outlined in its 1988 Charter. On its path 
to realize its ultimate goals, and acting upon the credo that “Islam is the Solution,” Hamas has 
persisted in killing and maiming Israelis, civilians and soldiers alike, through a variety of 
violent means. This article explores the Hamas as a longstanding terrorist organization and its 
instrumentality of violence in the Middle East. The argument is presented that although it is 
seen by some as a legitimate political and social movement Hamas has not departed from its 
violent practices in order to achieve its political objectives, and does not seem to qualify as a 
new and dynamic actor in the Middle East simply because it was elected to govern in Gaza. 
 
Keywords: Arab nationalists; Gaza; Intifada; Israel Defense Forces (IDF); Palestinian 
fundamentalism; terrorist activities; West Bank “Before Israel dies, it must be humiliated and 
degraded. Allah willing, before they die, they will experience humiliation and degradation 
every day.”– Dr. Mahmud Al-Zahar, Hamas leader in Gaza 
 
1. Introduction: 
Hamas is neither unique nor inherently different from previous terrorist organizations 
witnessed in world affairs. While its history is undeniably jeweled with vicious tactics 
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intended to help achieve its political objectives, the group has become internationally 
disreputable for organizing itself around terror and the instrumentality of violence for 
political effect. Yasser Arafat once remarked that, “we the Palestinians are the victims of the 
victims of European history. We have become the Jews of the Jews. But we do not want to 
make them the Palestinians of the Palestinians” (Arafat Quoted by Safieh in The Guardian, 
2004). As such, many have drawn upon instances in which Hamas appears to revolve around 
more than mere aggression and bloodshed. Various commentators, including states and 
international organizations have taken note of Hamas delivering a host of social, political, 
health, and educational services to Palestinians, offering the dissenting view that Hamas 
either represents more than a terrorist organization or is not a terrorist organization at all.
1
 
Few would likely contest the view that terrorism and terrorist movements have proved 
controversial issues in the past and in the contemporary international political and security 
environments. Yet, discussions pertaining to the formulation and activity of such terrorist 
movements, including their practice of political extremism, will likely continue to reveal both 
support and rejection of terrorism as a radical and violent movement, particularly in the 
context of Hamas. Dagblad (1989) in Weinberg (2005: p. 1) noted that terrorism may be seen 
as “a snare and delusion, a way of diverting the public‟s attention from the failings of 
Western governments,” while would-be detractors of this perspective might view terrorism 
and terrorist organizations as the “logical and just resistance of the people against state 
terrorism, capitalism, racism, sexism, and imperialism” (Schmid, 1993: p. 11). 
In spite of growing views about Hamas‟s role beyond the terrorism paradigm, one 
might aptly contend that a democratically elected Hamas, especially given that it continues to 
conduct violent action against both military and civilian targets, is still a terrorist 
organization. The group‟s activities and techniques enshrine these sentiments offered by 
Weinberg and Schmid, and convey a sense of obligation to either fight in favor or against the 
ideals upheld by Hamas or any other terrorist organization employing terrorist tactics in an 
attempt to further their eventual ambitions. 
This article presents an account of Hamas as a feature of the grand mosaic of terrorist 
organizations operating in the Middle East. The analysis presented in the following pages 
calls attention to the view that while Hamas has increasingly been seen as a social and 
                                                             
1
 There a currently a number of competing international designations of Hamas, with some states seeing the 
group as a terrorist organization while others do not.  Australia considers the military wing of Hamas a terrorist 
organization.  Canada, the European Union (EU), Israel, Japan, Jordan, the United Kingdom (UK), and the 
United States (US) all consider Hamas a terrorist organization while Norway, the Russian Federation, 
Switzerland, and Turkey do not currently designate Hamas as such. 
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political movement that is capable of engaging in the political processes of bargaining and 
power brokering while delivering a wide range of community services, it has not escaped the 
practice of violence and a sweeping violation of human rights and regional peace. In a sense, 
the current of politics in the Middle East has forced Hamas to choose between absolute Jihad 
against the state of Israel and Israelis and the path of tempered or controlled violence.  In both 
cases, it is evident that the existence of Hamas is fundamentally based upon the use of 
violence and terrorism regardless of which path it ultimately chooses to pursue. 
 
2. The Making of a Terror Organization: 
Hamas, a Palestinian fundamentalist socio-political organization and product of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, is currently the Palestinian Islamic political party that governs 
the Gaza Strip in the Middle East. Hamas made its first appearance during the Intifada (1987-
1993) – the Palestinian popular uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip (Carroll, 2005). It has been classified as a terrorist organization by a number of 
national bodies that include, in particular, the European Union (EU), United States (US), 
United Kingdom (UK), Canada, Israel, and Japan. However, this classification is not 
universally shared; neither the United Nations (UN), nor the governments of the Russian 
Federation, Turkey, or Switzerland apply the terrorist label to Hamas.  
 Fuelled by the values and doctrines propagated through Islamic Fundamentalism that 
spread throughout the Arab world in the final decade of the Cold War, the Hamas movement 
was co-founded in 1987 by Sheik Ahmed Yassin, who established the Islamic Center more 
than a decade prior in 1973 and was heavily influence by the Muslim Brotherhood. With the 
official Charter of Hamas created in 1988, Yassin proclaimed that Hamas would establish an 
Islamic state in the area that is now Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. In seeking to 
establish his order, Hamas brazenly violated and continues to violate both Palestinian Basic 
law and international human rights standards in West Bank as well as Gaza. Even after 
gaining official governing status, Hamas “security forces have committed grave offences 
against supporters of the opposing party, their families, and media representatives throughout 
Occupied Territories” (Freed, 2007: p. 13). Thus, part of Hamas‟s character may be defined 
by through its violations of even its own supporters. 
Initially, the Israelis who wanted to see the Palestinian movement split actually 
tolerated Yassin‟s activities and the influence of the PLO (Fatah). This is interesting to note 
particularly when taking into consideration the fact that the official Hamas Charter is 
inherently and virulently anti-Semitic, presenting absolutely no conditions under which the 
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terrorist group is or would ever be willing to compromise over its goal of removing each and 
every Jew from Palestine (Isseroff, 2004). Hence, the violent intentions of the group were 
made apparent upon the very inception of this ideological construct and movement nearly a 
quarter of a century ago. 
 Hamas has been the governing body of the Palestinian Territories since June 2007, 
following the victory that it won in securing the majority of seats in the Palestinian 
Parliament during the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections.  The victory came as 
a shock even to Palestinians living in Gaza who would not have conceived of Hamas ever 
possessing the ability to govern the territory. As noted by Milton-Edwards and Farrell (2010): 
Hamas was running in its first-ever national after two decades as a pariah. In the five 
years leading up to the elections its armed militants had killed more than 400 people – 
including Israeli soldiers, settlers and civilians, foreign tourists and immigrant workers – and 
carried out more than fifty suicide bombings. During this period Israelis from all walks of life 
were targeted, and treated as a monolithic mass by Hamas‟s enmity (p. 1). 
The military side of Hamas, known as the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (named 
after the Arab nationalist who was responsible for leading violent and militant activities 
against both the British and pro-Zionists operating in British Palestine), emerged just over a 
decade prior to the group being elected. This tradition, however, has been carried even 
beyond the 2007 election period; while it maintains a focus on occupying forces; the Israelis 
are now the primary occupiers that Hamas violently engages. 
 
3. Hamas’s Violent Ideology: 
 The modus operandi of Hamas centers on the principle of formulating a coherent 
military organization with the overall interest of supporting its primary aims and objectives; 
both may be regarded as forming a very conspicuous relationship of violent intention. 
Accordingly, Hamas‟s political and military philosophical structures combined with the 
determination of Israeli and other Western democratic communities that oppose it, present a 
caustic mixture that ultimately paved the way for a lengthy and vehement relationship. 
 The Hamas Charter of 1988 is the primary document on which the group operates. It 
is within this document that the essential aims and objectives of the group are portrayed. 
Hamas‟s Charter calls for the replacement of the state of Israel and the Palestinian territories 
with a new Islamic Palestinian State. The violent foundations on which Hamas was built are 
evident through the slogan that appears in the Charter that, “Allah is its target, the Prophet is 
its model, the Koran its constitution: Jihad is its path and death for the sake of Allah is the 
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loftiest of its wishes (Article 8)” (Times Online, 2006). In 2006, the current political leader of 
Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, asserted that Hamas was willing to call a truce with Israel that could 
last up to 20 years if a Palestinian state was formed within the 1967 lines, but added that 
Hamas would not recognize the “usurper Zionist government” and would carry forward its 
“jihad-like movement until the liberation of Jerusalem” (Haaretz Service & The Associated 
Press, 2006). 
 In spite of this sharp statement, Haniyeh claimed on December 1, 2010 that, “Hamas 
will respect the results (of a referendum) regardless of whether it differs with its ideology and 
principles” and that “[w]e accept a Palestinian state on the borders of 1967, with Jerusalem as 
its capital, the release of Palestinian prisoners, and the resolution of the issue of refugees” 
(Reuters, 2010). Consequently, it was during this time that Hamas revealed a fragment of 
doctrinal malleability and potential willingness to work with instead of fight against its 
neighbor(s). 
 
4. Understanding the Structure of Hamas: 
It is essential to consider the overall structure of Hamas in order to see that the 
group‟s arrangement puts it in good standing to engage in militant operations. A good way to 
understand Hamas‟s structure is to begin by dividing the group into various wings. Hamas is 
comprised of three interrelated wings that include: (1) the political wing, (2) the social 
welfare wing, and (3) the military wing (Levitt, 2009). The military wing is by far the most 
active within the occupied territories, especially given that the central goal of Hamas is to 
physically engage Israeli occupation forces. Subsequently, the occupied territories represent 
the frontlines of the organization. 
 
4.1 Political Wing: 
The Majilis al-Shura (Consultative Council) is Hamas‟s central political and decision-
making body, which is made-up of representatives from Gaza, the West Bank, Israeli prisons 
as well as the exiled leadership – the Political Bureau. Further embedded within the political 
wing of the group are various committees and subgroups responsible for supervising the 
range of activities that Hamas undertakes – from media relations to military operations 
(Levitt, 2009). 
 The most senior decision-making entity within the organization is the Political 
Bureau. All of the Bureau‟s 15 members operate from their headquarters, which is currently 
located in Damascus, Syria. Through what might be construed as something resembling a 
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quasi-democratic process, members who select their representatives in local Consultative 
Councils in specific geographic regions elect Hamas‟s Bureau. The councils then nominate 
representatives to the General Consultative Council, and members of the General 
Consultative Council subsequently elect the Political Bureau (Ma‟an News Agency, 2009). 
 
4.2 Social Welfare Wing: 
As the name of this wing implies, it is responsible for the social and welfare initiatives 
of Hamas. The social welfare wing is responsible for much of the popularity that Hamas 
receives in Palestinian territories, and to a lesser extent, throughout the Middle East, due in 
part to the social services that it provides to Palestinians in the occupied territories. The 
various services that this wing provides, includes the construction of schools and hospitals; 
Hamas spends approximately 90% of its annual $70 million operating budget on an extensive 
and rather impressive social services network (World Tribune, 2004). This expense 
constitutes a major pillar of support for the Hamas organization overall. In addition to the 
construction of vital services buildings, Hamas funds many relief and education programs, 
schools, orphanages, mosques, healthcare clinics, soup kitchens, and sports leagues, which do 
not necessarily receive financial assistance from the current Palestinian government (Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2006).  In spite of its generous work, it dubious whether or not Hamas 
actually uses this these efforts as a marketing tool for augmenting the influx of external 
funding, including donations, in order to fuel its bellicose operations 
Hamas has demonstrated its capacity to implement somewhat progressive and what 
might otherwise be considered “humanitarian” programs through its social welfare wing such 
as the funding of libraries as well as education centers for women, nurseries, kindergartens, 
and supervised religious schools that are able to provide meals to those attending and in need 
(Hilsenrath, 2005). One of this wing‟s more controversial programs, however – and one that 
brings into question the true intentions of the group, is the monetary support offered to the 
families of suicide bombers, particularly those who gave their lives in support of the primary 
cause of Hamas while other financial support is in place for families of militants who are not 
associated with the group (Levitt, 2007).  
One rather appropriate question raised as a result of these operations is the extent to 
which Hamas-funded education initiatives and programs support anti-Israeli, anti-Jewish, and 
anti-Western pedagogy. According to Robinson (2006), “Hamas is also well regarded by 
Palestinians for its efficiency and perceived lack of corruption compared to Fatah.” As a 
result of these efforts and since the Israeli military operation in Gaza, Palestinian public 
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opinion polls have shown that the popularity of Hamas is rising at a steady pace and is 
currently sitting at roughly 52% support compared to 13% support for its competitor, Fatah 
(Rubenstein, 2005). The same report fails to show whether the same group of votes supports 
the use of violence as legitimate means to achieving desired political objectives. 
 
4.3 Military Arm: 
As tends to be the case with any terrorist organization, the military wing is of great 
importance. It is responsible for recruiting and training new fighters as well as procuring new 
instruments with which to meet the objectives as established in Hamas‟s Charter. Armed 
Hamas cells have previously referred to themselves as “Students of Ayyash,” “Students of the 
Engineer,” or “Yahya Ayyash Units” to commemorate Yahya Ayyash, one of Hamas‟s early 
bomb-maker who was killed in 1996 (Kushner, 2002: p. 160; BBC News, 2006). Over time, 
the weapons capability of Hamas has increased considerably, and the military arm of the 
organization has been responsible for this development. Since Hamas‟s founding, the group 
has moved from the use of mere rifles to highly sophisticated weaponry such as self-
propelled rockets and mortars (Chosak and Sawyer, 2005). 
Another shift in the acculturation of violence and violent acts against military and 
unarmed targets can be seen in Hamas‟s movement from the use of suicide bombers to the 
use of Qassam Rocket Brigades against residential areas of Israeli communities. It is likely, 
though, that given the opportunity to employ more advanced weapons capabilities, Hamas 
would not hesitate to do so.  A statement made by Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantissi in 2002, reveals 
the intentions of the group‟s leadership, which urged that, “[s]ince we don‟t have F16s or 
Apache missiles or tanks we have our own weapons to defend ourselves. Believe me, if we 
had F16s we would never use suicide attacks” (Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010: p. 110). 
Until Hamas is able to procure weapons capable to inflicting greater casualties against 
the state of Israel, the group continues to rely on a diverse arsenal. In one bloody instant, at 
Passover on March 27, 2002, 250 Jews gathered in a ballroom in the seaside town of Netanya 
to celebrate one of the holiest days in the Jewish calendar.  Shortly after 7 p.m., 25-year-old 
Abdel Baset Odeh entered into the Park Hotel and detonated a suicide device that was so 
powerful as to kill 30 guests and 140 wounded (Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010: p. 110). 
Since the massacre at Netanyu, Hamas has demonstrated an escalation of violence and 
the use of force against both military personnel and civilians.  Hamas‟s military wing and Izz 
ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades have recently committed the deadliest assault against Israelis in 
their history of violent activity, which was reported as even atrocious than the massacre of 21 
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young Israeli men and women and injuring 132 in Tel Aviv less than a year prior (Fisher, 
2006; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010). The slaughter of the partygoers outside the 
Dolphinarium in the Israeli capital is often considered equal in scale of atrocity to that of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Japanese Red Army massacre at 
Lod Airport (now Ben Gurion International Airport) on May 30, 1972 in which 26 innocent 
bystanders were brutally killed in a shooting spree and another 79 wounded (Sloan, Bersia, 
and Hill, 2006; Milton-Edwards and Farrell, 2010). 
 Western democracies do not currently retain a complete picture of the military arm of 
Hamas. For instance, only an approximate estimation of the force size of the Brigades is 
currently known. The number is thought to rest somewhere in the neighborhood of several 
hundred members. Of these, all or a great deal of them receive military-style training, and 
receive their training in camps located in Iran and Syria (Australian National Security). 
According to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008), Hamas “has more than 10,000 
operatives in the Gaza Strip. That figure may be larger because of Hamas‟s intense recruiting 
process since it took over the Gaza Strip.” Yet, an extensive number of operatives that form 
part of the group‟s military wing serve in the internal security forces, therefore, “the total 
number of Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades and internal security force operatives controlled by 
Hamas,” according to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008) “is, in our estimation, 
about 15,000.” 
 Hamas‟s military wing is not a classic military organization; rather, it should be 
considered an asymmetric force because of the tactics of warfare that it employs when under 
force. Such tactics include: the operation of small fighting units, the employment of guerrilla 
warfare, concealment among the civil population, the controversial use of civilians as human 
shields, and the recruitment of child soldiers (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008).  All 
of these elements contribute to the escalation of Hamas‟s violent capabilities as well as their 
recent track record. 
 
5. Leading the Islamic Militant Group: 
With its Charter in place, Hamas was formed around February 1988, at which point the 
founding leaders of the organization included Ahmad assin, „Abd al-Fattah Dukhan, 
Muhammed Shama,‟ Ibrahim al-Yazuri, Issa al-Najjar, Salah Shehadeh (from Bayt Hanun) 
and Abd al-Aziz Rantisi. However, Dr. Mahmud Zahar is also typically considered one of the 
original leaders of Hamas (Isseroff, 2004). Subsequent leaders of the organization also 
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include, Sheikh Khalil Qawqa, Isa al-Ashar, Musa Abu Marzuq, Ibrahim Ghusha, and Khalid 
Mish‟al (Isseroff, 2004). 
 Even though the overall structure, including the leadership structure of Hamas, may 
be divided into three separate wings, understanding Hamas‟s leadership edifice has proven 
rather problematic. At best, its leadership could be seen as having a minimal level of 
organized leadership (Carroll, 2005). In February 2005, Israel ceased targeting the various 
leaders of Hamas since a ceasefire was declared just prior to that date. However, before the 
ceasefire, Israel was engaged in a campaign to completely annihilate the leadership of the 
Islamic militant group ahead of Israel‟s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005 
(Global Security, 2011). 
The Israeli government‟s efforts proved quite successful between 2003 and 2004, during 
which time Israel claimed the lives of several Hamas leaders and high-ranking officials. After 
Hamas‟s Abdel Rantisi was killed on April 17, 2004, the decision was taken to avoid the 
creation of further leadership targets for their opponents (Global Security, 2011). This step 
had simultaneously robbed Israel of the option to target specific leadership elements within 
the Hamas movement, which subsequently deprived Hamas of any single and clear individual 
with whom to lead the organization. 
 Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the founding-leader of Hamas, was killed on March 22, 2004 in 
the northern Gaza Strip (Hunter, 2009). His death, the result of an Israeli retaliation strike 
against Hamas‟s deadly attack that killed four Israeli border guards, radically altered the 
nature of Hamas‟s leadership matrix (Global Security, 2011). Since its founding, Yassin had 
been the organization‟s central authority. In addition to being the senior authority in the 
decision making process in implementing terrorist attacks, Yassin was the main address in 
matters that ultimately determined the policy for terrorism and indiscriminate targeting of 
Israelis with the intent of causing massive scale of casualties. Many within and beyond 
Hamas regarded Yassin as a charismatic individual and the primary mechanism in the many 
terrorist assaults that were carried-out against Israel. 
 Following Yassin‟s assassination, Abdel Aziz Rantisi was chosen to assume the 
leadership role of Hamas due to his history as one of the original six founders of the 
organization. Rantisi has been responsible for new terrorist policy undertaken by the 
organization and acted as its main spokesperson (Global Security, 2011). His position within 
Hamas was firmly established following his move to the Sheikh Radwan neighborhood in 
Gaza in September 2000. After he moved and solidified his position, Rantisi immediately 
fulfilled the role of “virulent incitement, repeatedly calling for suicide attacks inside Israel, 
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continued attacks in Gaza, kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, and firing of mortar shells into 
Israel” (Global Security, 2011). 
 Abdullah Qawasmeh masterminded a campaign of suicide attacks undertaken by the 
Hamas movement that, among other deadly attacks, resulted in the destruction of a bus that 
killed 17 innocent people (Global Security, 2011). Israeli Border Police that entered Hebron 
on June 21, 2003 killed Qawasmeh, a high-ranking official within the group. His death was 
preceded by Yasser Taha‟s – a leader of Hamas‟s military wing that took place on June 12, 
2003 when an Israeli helicopter gunship launched several missiles at a car identified for 
carrying Hamas activists (Global Security, 2011). 
Khaled Mashal, an instructor of physics and director of Hamas‟s Political Bureau 
from Damascus referred to himself at the group‟s “first head” after the killing of Rantisi in 
2004 (Global Security, 2011). Mashal is considered the highest-ranking member of the 
organization. Working with the Fatah to forge a partnership in an attempt to govern 
Palestinians, and suggesting the need to form a Palestinian army in order to defend what is 
referred to as Palestine from future aggression, Mashal cannot be considered Hamas‟s 
primary leader. Mahmoud Zahar is another one of Hamas‟s top-ranking officials as well as 
one original founders of the group. He was the original public spokesperson for the 
organization when it was established, and he is often considered a rival of Rantisi and Mashal 
(Global Security, 2011). 
Following the killing of Rantisi in 2004, Hamas‟s Damascus-based leader, Mashal, 
instructed the group to keep the name of its new Gaza leader secret. But it soon came-out that 
Mahmoud Zahar, who had been Rantisi‟s second in command, was part of a “collective 
leadership” of Hamas‟ Gaza Strip stronghold. The other members of this leadership include 
Ismail Haniyeh. Zahar, though, he is considered the most senior member of the leadership 
(Global Security, 2011). 
Given that Israeli forces eliminated the original founding-leader of Hamas in 2004, 
and that several other high-ranking officials within the organization have also been killed, the 
conjecture can be safely cast that the overall leadership structure of the group has been 
shaken, if not weakened. Thus, referring to the leadership structure of Hamas as “vertical” 
might be somewhat remiss. Instead, it might be seen as a horizontal terrorist organization not 
unlike that of al-Qaeda, with cells operating in different and varying locales but still adhering 
to the same ideological doctrine, and striving to meet the ultimate objectives as established in 
Hamas‟s Charter. 
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Following the overwhelming victory that Hamas experienced during the Palestinian 
elections of January 26, 2006, Zahar made the announcement that the group would seek to 
extend its year-old truce with the state of Israel but only in the event that the Israeli 
government reciprocated (Global Security, 2011). In this vein, it is clear that steps have been 
taken that have resulted in a gap, and subsequently a widening of that gap, between Hamas 
and its original Charter declaring the destruction of Israel and the removal of every Jew from 
its territory. The result might be an increased schism within the leadership structure of Hamas 
as some adhere to the principles of the Charter, while others seek to establish the organization 
as what international actors and communities perceive of as a more “legitimate” element of 
political representation.  In spite of this, even those who do not adhere to the original 
principles of the Charter have failed to condemn the violent tactics frequently employed by 
the group overall. 
 
6. Funding Hamas’s Operations: 
Hamas has consistently received much of its funding from Palestinian expatriates and 
Muslim donors living overseas. Since 9/11, the US government has sought to interdict the 
flow of funds to Hamas and other transnational terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda by 
freezing the assets of organizations, charities, banks, as well as front companies thought to be 
mechanisms of funding Hamas. 
The reduction of funding to Hamas as a result of American pressure on states that 
were previous donors to Hamas has shown that Hamas need to rely on sources that share 
Hama‟s ideological bases.  Thus, Iran has become the largest support of Hamas, having also 
stated its intention to see the state of Israel wiped from the map.  Considering the 
contributions made by Iran and other Gulf States, some have estimated the Hamas receives 
anywhere from $20 million to $30 million per year (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006).   
 
7. Hamas’s Reign of Terror: 
As shown by its long-term history, Hamas has proven itself as one of the most 
extreme and violent terrorist groups to operate against the state of Israel. Leaflet #65 
(October 1990) urged local residents to undertake malicious and heinous acts against Jews, 
including murder and the destruction of Jewish-owned property. According to the leaflet, 
“[e]very Jew or settler is a target and must be killed. Their blood and their property are 
forfeit” (Ganor, 1992). 
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 Remaining loyal to their religious duty, as outlined in the Charter, followers of Hamas 
have carried-out such attacks as the murder of workers at a factory in Jaffa in December 
1990, the infiltration of a six-man terrorist squad from Jordan in March 1991 that wounded 
three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers before they were caught in the vicinity of Kibbutz 
Tirat Zvi, and whose members carried Korans and photographs of Yassin in addition to 
weapons, the murder of Shlomo Yehiya from Moshav Kadima in September 1991, and the 
attack at Tel Hashomer junction in October 1991 in which two IDF soldiers were killed and 
11 others seriously wounded (Ganor, 1992). 
Hamas has also been responsible for the kidnapping and murder of Israeli soldiers. 
Avi Sasportas and Ilan Saadon were among the most serious carried-out by Hamas in 1989. 
Another two soldiers were murdered after they were picked-up as hitchhikers on the side of a 
road. Both were shot and later buried by their assailants (Ganor, 1992). Even though Hamas 
has been responsible for the serious attacks launched against Israeli citizens and soldiers, the 
group has not, however, limited its violent and murderous acts to Israeli targets. Hamas‟s 
operatives were also involved in many murders of Palestinians who were deemed disloyal or 
operated against Hamas in the territories (Ganor, 1992) as is the case with members of al-
Qaeda targeting other Muslims considered traitors for aiding the American infidels and their 
allies. 
 Since Hamas launched its campaign of violence against Israeli soldiers and civilians, 
hundreds of attacks have been carried-out. Appendix 2 illustrates some of the major attacks 
included in Hamas‟s extensive campaign of violence between 2001 and 2010.  Further to 
Hamas‟s radically violent nature, as highlighted in previous sections of this article, Qassam 
rockets launched against Israel have resulted in 21 deaths between November 2001 and June 
2008. These rockets have been fired at residence buildings, kindergartens, nurseries, 
settlements, military establishments, and other targets that host a concentration of Israeli 
citizens or military personnel (The Israel Project, 2009).   
 
8. The Strategic Impact of Hamas’s Terrorist Activities: 
Hamas has made its mark, not merely as a terrorist organization, but also as a unique 
political actor in the Middle East – an Islamic movement that seeks to make strident change 
in domestic policy. Hamas, as a traditional and not-so-traditional actor, has been quite 
successful of impacting a great deal of the Middle East and Middle Eastern politics and 
political relations, if regrettably in very hostile and destructive manner. Indeed, the “impact 
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of its ideology and tactics has inadvertently and indirectly risen to a regional scale” (Carroll, 
2005). 
 Due to the malicious and contentious nature of Hamas‟s activities enacted against a 
state system, Hamas might well be regarded as one of the most destabilizing force for the 
power of Middle Eastern governments and states. Since Hamas‟s threat potential has a direct 
impact on the interests of Western democracies and their allies (such as Israel), enhanced 
security and defense capabilities rests on all states‟ and their citizens‟ heightened awareness 
of Hamas‟s direct and indirect ability to fundamentally and effectively alter regional security. 
The group‟s awareness of its influence in these ways also greatly leverages its power, which 
is often understated by a number of international actors. 
 As made apparent in the preceding pages, terrorism is a form of violence or threatened 
violence that seeks to deliver a message to a broader audience. As with any terrorist 
organization, Hamas has incorporated innocent bystanders as the medium through which to 
send its message(s). The victims represent the means to an end, and the group is well aware 
of its targets and the impact that is ultimately has on those and the still living targets. 
However, in its attempt to impact the structure of governance and power in the Israel and the 
Palestinian territories, Hamas‟s actions have inadvertently led to a negative impact on its own 
existence. This is best depicted through the strain that it experiences as the new governing 
body in Gaza – a role for which it was never properly prepared, and which stunned even the 
Palestinian community. 
 Hamas has made a further and, if lamentably, positive impact on the field of terrorism 
through its various methods and tactics. The group has become highly innovative in its use of 
weaponry, escalating from the use of rifles, and simple bombs to more sophisticated suicide 
belts and devices, and even to the use of mortars hurled at civilian targets. Most terrorists in 
the modern world prefer the use of the bomb and the gun, Hamas has not only shown that it 
incorporates a wide array of tactics that range from kidnapping to suicide bombings, it has 
also moved beyond the bomb and the gun and even the basic mortar, putting to work 
sophisticated rocketry in its bid for power. While many terrorist organizations across the 
globe continue to use precisely the same type of weapons that anarchists and revolutionaries 
used centuries ago, Hamas has been a “leader” in its use of miniaturized and sophisticated 
weaponry as illustrated through its Qassam rocket campaigns, and the frequency with which 
it continues to molest Israeli society. 
 Hamas further impacts the role of the media in terrorism as well, portraying its own 
performances and initiating its own websites as a means of amplifying its potential and 
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power. Even given the role of its media base as well as its many tactics, strategies, and 
innovations, Hamas has made perhaps its most significant impact by compelling Western 
governments‟ consideration to its cause and its deadly effect. So convincing have the efforts 
of Hamas been in this manner, that it has been able to win the support of a great deal of 
Palestinians and earn a role in political representation and responsibility – an achievement 
rarely, if ever, witnessed in the realm of terrorism. In spite of its moderate and still short-term 
success, the future of Hamas‟s emerging roles, however, are likely to remain as contentious 
and hotly challenged as its traditional ones. 
 
9. The Future of Hamas: 
Although there seems to be no clear or definitive leadership within the Hamas 
organization, a quasi-seniority-based leadership structure appears to be in place. Some might 
consider the lack of an official and single authority within the organization a great 
disadvantage to the overall operation and capacity of Hamas to function and meet its ultimate 
aims and objectives as laid-out in its Charter. 
The credibility of any sort of rebuttal to this belief might rest in the essential lack of a 
central figure, and further draw on the group‟s cooperation with government forces in 
Palestinian territories, supporting the idea that Hamas‟s real strength could lie in its 
representation among local populations throughout region. As such, the true power of Hamas 
seems to resonate with average Palestinians for whom the group fights but even average 
Palestinians were shocked when Hamas was elected as the governing body of Gaza. 
As illustrated previously, Fatah is supported by only a small fraction of the Palestinian 
population, whereas Hamas presently boasts the support of over half of these people. As 
Hamas works closer with political authorities, and given its recognition by a number of main 
actors in world affairs like the UN, Russia, and the Norwegian government, among others, 
Hamas might very well remain a permanent feature of the political landscape within the 
Middle East in spite of the propensity to indiscriminately slaughter innocent bystanders in 
Israeli communities in order to gain support for its cause. 
 Hamas‟s Charter constitutes one of the main challenges to its own existence. Even as 
many within the international community, particularly the UN, refuse to brand Hamas as a 
terrorist organization, they continue to challenge Hamas‟s authority simply because of its 
murderous edicts such as the destruction of Israel and the death of innocent Jews. The very 
people and institutions that Hamas might ultimately have to work with cannot simply or 
readily endorse the indiscriminative violence, in which Hamas engages and sponsors. This is 
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particularly the case if Hamas should like to achieve a greater sense of representation and 
legitimacy in the current geopolitical realm. 
 Despite the many roadblocks that Hamas faces, whether self-imposed or not, it has 
attempted to reconcile ideological thorns and engage in a courtship with political realism. Its 
election victory can be seen as the move promising, even if unexpected, stride towards a 
different brand of existence with its opposition. Hamas, according to Amayreh (2007), “has 
been debating ways and means to reconcile its erstwhile radical Islamist ideology with the 
pressing need to meet practical political requirements.” Many have argued that the political 
relevance of Hamas‟s original charter has become stale and is now past its own expiration 
date, no longer able to appropriately dictate the political comportment of the group. Islamists 
have used such words as “anachronistic,” “outdated,” and “historical” to describe the 1988 
Charter (Amayreh, 2007). 
 The National Reconciliation Accord, a document created in the summer of 2006, 
stated that Palestinian national and Islamic factions agreed to “respect” every relevant UN 
resolution, including UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 194, which calls for 
repatriation of and indemnification for Palestinian refugees uprooted from their homes in 
1948 in what is now Israel (Amayreh, 2007). As such, the acceptance of this document can be 
seen as a fundamental ideological concession made by Hamas but cannot be seen exclusively 
as the means by which Hamas is “changing its ways.” 
 Additionally, one must consider the financial capacity of Hamas to continue operating 
in accordance with its historical character. The West‟s crippling sanctions, which were 
enforced by local and regional banks, have drilled the fundamentalist movement into a state 
of bankruptcy (Amayreh, 2007). Hamas leaders have also admitted that it was largely 
unprepared for the governing responsibilities that it inherited when it assumed possession of 
the Gaza Strip in in mid-June of 2007. The strain of civil governance and continued conflict 
with Fatah amid a bleak financial state has caused what Amaryeh (2007), has referred to as a 
“political and social implosion.” 
 As many Hamas members and high-ranking officials increasingly recognize the 
importance of initiating dialog with the West, especially given the growing state of 
interdependency in the intricate global village in which all political, social, and economic 
actors now operate, there is growing proof that Hamas has and will continue to effectively 
scrap a great deal of its self-injurious ideological rigidity and superficial power. What 
remains to be seen, is whether Hamas is able to shed its identity as a terrorist organization, 
which is anything but an unfair sobriquet 
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10. Conclusion 
In general, Hamas does not appear to qualify as a new and dynamic actor in the 
Middle East simply because it was elected to govern in Gaza. As many might see it, a 
terrorist group that is democratically elected, is still a terrorist group.  However, Hamas have 
proved itself a group that has a particular degree of influence over the population that it 
purports to represent, even if not all Palestinians necessarily support their beliefs and the 
manner the group seeks to realize its political aims.  Moreover, Hamas has persisted in killing 
and maiming Israelis, civilians and soldiers alike through a variety of violent means, and no 
signs have surfaced as of late to indicate that Hamas will depart from such tactics in the near 
future. Much of Hamas‟s track record, even as recent as 2002, lends credibility to the view 
that Hamas is likely to hold on to its terrorist actions and, according to the statements offered 
by Rantissi, escalate its instrumentality of violence should it be able to procure the means to 
adequately do so. 
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Appendix 1: 
Israel and Occupied Territories Sine 1967 
 
Source: (Global Security, 2011) 
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Appendix 2: 
Hamas’s Rocket Assault Against Israel, 2008 
 
Source: (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2008). 
 
Appendix 3: 
Hamas’s Rocket Assault Against Israel, 2000-2007 
 
Source: (Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2008). 
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Appendix 4: 
Select Hamas Terrorist Attacks against Israel 
September 1, 2010 Two Israelis were wounded, one seriously, when 
Hamas terrorists ambushed their car as the couple was 
driving near Kochav Hashachar. 
August 31, 2010 Four Israelis, including a pregnant woman, were 
murdered when terrorists ambushed their car as they 
were driving near Kiryat Arba in the West Bank. 
Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack, which 
coincided with the restarting of Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks. 
August 28, 2005 A suicide bombing outside the Central Bus Station in 
Beersheba severely injured two security guards who 
stopped the bomber from entering the bus station. 
January 13, 2005 Six Israelis were killed and five other civilians were 
wounded in a double suicide bombing at the Karni 
crossing between Israel and the Gaza Strip. The two 
suicide bombers used a very large explosive device to 
blast through a defensive wall that separates the Israeli 
and Palestinian sides at the crossing. Following the 
blast, the bombers crossed into the Israeli side, carrying 
explosives on their bodies, which they detonated.  
August 28, 2004 16 people, including a 3-year-old, were killed and about 
100 injured when two buses in Beersheba were attacked 
within minutes of each other by suicide bombers. 
June 28, 2004 A Qassam rocket fired by Hamas terrorists in the Gaza 
Strip struck near a nursery school in the northern Negev 
town of Sderot, killing an Israeli man and a 4-year-old 
Israeli child. 
April 17, 2004 A border policeman was killed and three others 
wounded when a Palestinian suicide bomber blew 
himself up at the Erez Crossing in Gaza. 
March 14, 2004 10 people were killed and 16 wounded in a double 
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suicide bombing in the area of the Ashdod Port. Hamas 
and Fatah claimed responsibility for the attack. 
January 14, 2004 A female suicide bomber killed four people and 
wounded 20 at the Erez Crossing in the Gaza Strip. 
Hamas and the Fatah Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades 
claimed responsibility for the attack. 
October 15, 2003 Three Americans were killed and one wounded at the 
Beit Hanoun junction in the Gaza Strip when a massive 
bomb demolished an armor-plated jeep in a convoy 
carrying US diplomats and Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) personnel. Both the militant Islamic Jihad and 
Hamas movements denied responsibility for the attack. 
September 9, 2003 Hamas claimed responsibility for two suicide 
bombings, the first at an entrance to the Tzrifin army 
base near Rishon Lezion and the second at Café Hillel 
in the German colony neighborhood of Jerusalem, 
which killed a total of 15 people and wounded at least 
80. 
August 19, 2003 Hamas and Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the 
suicide bombing of a bus in Jerusalem killing at least 
18 people and wounding nearly 100. 
August 12, 2003 Suicide bombers killed two Israelis and wounded more 
than a dozen people in two attacks within a half hour of 
each other, one at a shopping mall in the Tel Aviv 
suburb of Rosh Ha‟ayin and the other at the entrance of 
the West Bank town of Ariel. The Al Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigade claimed responsibility for the Rosh Ha‟ayin 
bombing and Hamas claimed to have carried out the 
Ariel attack. 
June 20, 2003 An Israeli motorist was shot dead and three of his 
passengers were wounded when their car was fired 
upon by Palestinian terrorists near Ofra, north of 
Ramallah. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. 
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June 11, 2003 16 people were killed and more than 80 wounded when 
a suicide bomber blew up a Jerusalem city bus during 
the afternoon rush hour. The bomber was disguised as 
an ultra-orthodox Jew. Hamas claimed responsibility 
for the attack. 
May 19, 2003 A Palestinian suicide bomber on a bicycle attacked an 
Israeli checkpoint on the Gaza Strip, wounding three 
Israeli soldiers. Hamas claimed responsibility. 
May 18, 2003 Seven people were killed and more than 20 wounded 
when a suicide bomber blew up a Jerusalem city bus at 
the start of the Israeli work-week. The bomber was 
disguised as an ultra-orthodox Jew. Soon after, a 
suicide bomber carrying explosives and dressed in the 
garb of an ultra-orthodox Jew was stopped at a 
roadblock. The Palestinian detonated his explosives, 
killing only himself. Hamas claimed responsibility in 
both attacks. 
May 17, 2003 A pregnant Israeli woman and her husband were killed 
when a suicide bomber detonated himself next to them 
in a public square in Hebron. Hamas claimed 
responsibility. 
April 30, 2003 Three people were killed and dozens wounded in a 
suicide bombing at a beachfront pub in Tel Aviv. The 
Fatah Tanzim and Hamas claimed responsibility for the 
attack, carried out as a joint operation. 
March 7, 2003 Two Israelis were killed and five were wounded when 
armed terrorists infiltrated the community of Kiryat 
Arba and attacked during Shabbat. Hamas claimed 
responsibility for the attack. 
March 5, 2003 16 people were killed and more than 30 wounded when 
a terrorist detonated a powerful bomb on a bus en route 
to Haifa University. Hamas claimed responsibility for 
the attack. 
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January 5, 2003 22 people were killed and about 120 wounded in a 
double suicide bombing near the old Central Bus 
Station in Tel Aviv. The Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas all claimed responsibility for 
the attacks. 
November 21, 2002 Eleven people were killed and 47 injured when a 
Palestinian suicide bomber exploded on a bus filled 
with passengers, including schoolchildren, in the Kiryat 
Menahem neighborhood in Jerusalem. The bus was 
traveling toward the center of the city during the 
morning rush hour. Hamas claimed responsibility for 
the attack. 
October 27, 2002 Two Israeli police officers and a soldier were killed, 
and 20 bystanders were wounded in a suicide bombing 
at a gas station near the settlement of Ariel in the West 
Bank. The two officers and soldier were killed while 
trying to prevent the terrorist from detonating the 
bomb. Hamas and the Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades 
claimed responsibility for the attack. 
September 19, 2002 Six people were killed and 60 wounded when a terrorist 
detonated a bomb on one of Tel Aviv's busiest streets, 
in a bus opposite the Great Synagogue. Many of the 
wounded were in critical or serious condition. Both 
Islamic Jihad and Hamas claimed responsibility for the 
attack. 
August 4, 2002 Nine people were killed and about 50 wounded in a 
suicide bombing of an Egged bus at the Meron junction 
in northern Israel. Hamas claimed responsibility for the 
attack. 
July 3, 2002 Eight people were killed and 86 injured, 14 seriously, 
when a bomb went off at the Frank Sinatra Cafeteria on 
the Hebrew University Mt. Scopus campus during the 
busy lunchtime rush. Israeli authorities reported that the 
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explosive device had been planted ahead of time, with 
the terrorist possibly detonating it by remote control. 
Five Americans were among the dead. Hamas claimed 
responsibility for the attack. 
June 18, 2002 19 people were killed and more than 70 were injured, in 
a suicide bombing on a bus just outside of Jerusalem. 
The bus, which was completely destroyed, was 
traveling from Gilo to Jerusalem and had many students 
on board. In addition to the bus, at least two other 
vehicles were severely damaged in the attack. Hamas 
claimed responsibility. 
June 8, 2002 Three Israelis, including a pregnant woman, were 
killed, and five were injured when an armed terrorist 
infiltrated the community of Carmei Tzur, south of 
Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. 
May 19, 2002 Three Israelis were killed and more than 50 injured in a 
suicide bombing at an open-air market in Netanya. A 
Palestinian disguised as an Israeli soldier carried out the 
attack. Both Hamas and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility. Two of 
the victims were identified as Yosef Haviv, 70 and 
Arkadi Wiselman, 40, both of Netanya. Wiselman, a 
chef at the Park Hotel, survived the Passover bombing 
on March 27. 
April 27, 2002 Three Palestinian gunmen disguised as Israeli Army 
soldiers cut through the perimeter fence of Adora, a 
settlement on the West Bank, and entered several 
homes, firing on residents in their bedrooms. Four 
people, including a 5-year-old girl, were killed in the 
attacks. Another seven were injured, including one 
seriously. Both Hamas and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility. 
March 31, 2002 Fourteen people were killed and more than 40 injured 
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in a suicide bombing in Haifa, in the Matza gas station 
restaurant near a shopping mall. Several of the injured 
were in serious to critical condition. Hamas claimed 
responsibility for the attack. 
March 27, 2002 22 people were killed and 140 injured – 20 seriously – 
in a suicide bombing at the Park Hotel in the coastal 
city of Netanya, in the midst of the Passover holiday 
seder with 250 guests. Hamas claimed responsibility for 
the attack. 
March 19, 2002 1
st
 Lt. Tal Zemach, 20, of Kibbutz Hulda, was killed 
and three soldiers were injured when Palestinian 
terrorists opened fire at the paratroop training 
compound in the Jordan Valley. Hamas claimed 
responsibility for the attack. 
March 9, 2002 Eleven people were killed and 54 injured, 10 of them 
seriously, when a suicide bomber exploded at in a 
crowded cafe at the corner of Aza and Ben-Maimon 
streets in the Rehavia neighborhood in the center of 
Jerusalem. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. 
March 7, 2002 Aharon Krogliak of Beit El, Tal Kurtzweil of Bnei 
Brak, Asher Marcus of Jerusalem, Eran Pikar of 
Jerusalem, and Ariel Zana of Jerusalem, all aged 18, 
were killed and 23 people were injured, four seriously, 
when a Palestinian gunman penetrated a highschool 
that combines religious studies and military training in 
the Gush Katif settlement of Atzmona late Thursday 
night. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. 
March 5, 2002 Palestinians fired two Qassam II rockets at the city of 
Sderot shortly before 18:00 PM on Tuesday. One of the 
rockets hit a residential building, moderately wounding 
a 16-month-old infant. Hamas claimed responsibility 
for the attack. 
February 10, 2002 A drive-by terrorist shooting at the entrance to the IDF 
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Source: (Anti-Defamation League, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Southern Command base in Be‟er Sheva killed two 
female soldiers and injured four others. One of the 
Palestinian terrorists was killed at the scene; the 
second, wearing an explosives belt, fled in the direction 
of a nearby school when he was shot and killed by a 
soldier and police officer. Hamas claimed responsibility 
for the attack. 
December 2, 2001 A suicide bombing on a No. 16 Egged bus in Haifa 
killed 15 people and injured about 40 people. Hamas 
claimed responsibility for the Haifa blast, while 
Hizbullah‟s radio and television stations expressed 
support for the attacks. 
December 1, 2001 A double suicide bombing at the Ben-Yehuda 
pedestrian mall in Jerusalem at 11:30 p.m. on a 
Saturday night killed 11 people, aged 12-21, and 
injured 188 people. A car bomb exploded 20 minutes 
later. Hamas claimed responsibility for the attack. 
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Appendix 5: 
Timeline: The Evolution of Hamas 
From December 24, 2008 The rocket attacks from Hamas increase and so do the 
retaliation air strikes from Israel.  
December 19, 2008 Hamas formally ends cease-fire with Israel. Attacks 
between the two had continued the entire time to 
some degree, escalating more in November. 
June 2008 Cease-fire truce between Hamas and Israel negotiated 
by Egypt goes into effect. Hamas agrees to stop firing 
rockets at Israeli border communities and Israel will 
allow limited trade into and out of Gaza. The cease-
fire has a six-month deadline. 
April 18-19, 2008 Former US President Jimmy Carter meets with exiled 
Hamas leader Khalid Meshaal, in Damascus, Syria. 
June 14, 2007 Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas 
dissolves the government and dismisses Ismail 
Haniya as Prime Minister. Haniya rejects this and 
remains the de facto leader in Gaza. 
Early June 2007 After a week of battles between Hamas and Fatah, 
Hamas seizes control of Gaza. 
June 25, 2006 Hamas militants attack an Israeli military post and 
kill two soldiers. A third, Gilad Shalit, is kidnapped. 
The Palestinian government denies any knowledge of 
the attack. 
March 29, 2006 The new Palestinian Prime Minister, Ismail Haniya, 
and his cabinet are sworn in. The governments of the 
United States and Canada say they will have no 
contact with the Hamas-led Palestinian government. 
January 26, 2006 Hamas wins a landslide victory in the Palestinian 
legislative elections. Hamas wins 76 seats, and Fatah 
43 seats in the 132-seat Palestinian Legislative 
Council, giving Hamas a majority. 
January 25, 2006 Hamas, running as the “Change and Reform Party,” 
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participates for the first time in Palestinian 
parliamentary elections. The group is fielding 62 
candidates. 
January 14, 2005 A bomb at the Karni crossing at the Israel-Gaza 
border kills six Israelis. Hamas claims responsibility. 
December 12, 2004 An attack at a checkpoint on the border between the 
Gaza Strip and Egypt kills five Israelis. Hamas claims 
responsibility 
September 26, 2004 A leading member of Hamas, Izz Eldin Subhi Sheikh 
Khalil, is killed by a car bomb as he leaves his home 
in Damascus, Syria. 
August 31, 2004 The Islamic militant group Hamas claims 
responsibility for deadly simultaneous explosions on 
two buses in the southern Israeli city of Beer Sheva 
that killed at least 14 people and wounding more than 
80. 
April 17, 2004 Rantisi is killed by an Israeli air strike on his car. 
March 23, 2004 Dr. Abdel Aziz Rantisi is named as Yassin‟s 
successor. 
March 22, 2004 Hamas leader Yassin is killed by Israeli air strikes. 
March 14, 2004 Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades claim 
responsibility for a double attack at the Israeli port of 
Ashdod that kills 10 Israelis. 
January 2004 The first Hamas female suicide bomber kills four 
Israelis at Erez crossing in a joint operation with the 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. 
August 20, 2003 A suicide bomber detonates himself on a bus killing 
at least 20 Israelis. Hamas and Islamic Jihad claim 
responsibility 
June 12, 2003 A suicide bomber disguised as an ultra-orthodox Jew 
detonates himself on a Jerusalem bus, killing 16 
Israelis. Hamas claims responsibility. 
2001 The US State Department lists Hamas on its official 
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list of terrorist groups. 
1999 King Abdullah of Jordan closes down Hamas 
headquarters in Jordan. 
1997 Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin is released from 
prison. 
February to March 1996 The Palestinian Authority cracks down on Hamas, 
after a series of Hamas-orchestrated suicide bombings 
in Israel kill more than 50 people. Palestinian 
President Yasser Arafat condemns the bombings, 
referring to them as “a terrorist operation.” Later, the 
PNA arrests approximately 140 suspected Hamas 
members. 
April 1994 Hamas orchestrates its first suicide bombing. Five are 
killed in the Israeli city of Hedera. 
1989 An Israeli court convicts Hamas leader Sheikh 
Ahmed Yassin of ordering Hamas members to kidnap 
and kill two Israeli soldiers. 
1988 The covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement is 
published. The group presents itself as an alternative 
to the PLO. 
Source: (Wilkinson, 2008).  
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